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A

mmunition is an essential resource for the implementation of a national defense and security
policy. National ammunition stockpiles—regardless

of their functional classification—can pose risks to national
security and public safety.1 Poor accounting and inadequate
physical security of storage facilities can lead to the diversion of ammunition from the national stockpile to terrorists,
criminals, and other armed groups, increasing insecurity and
instability. Furthermore, the deterioration of munition components can contribute to unplanned explosions at munitions
sites (UEMS), which can have significant negative socioeconomic and political consequences for the public and national governments.2 Comprehensive ammunition management
ensures that the right types and quantities of ammunition are
available, at the right time, to support national strategic and

A Practical Guide to LCMA Handbook and the case study,
“LCMA: Lessons Learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” this
article provides an abridged version of the LCMA model and
the lessons learned from efforts to establish LCMA in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH).4–6 Perhaps more importantly, it also
invites policy-practitioners to think creatively about ammunition management and argues that national ownership creates
an enabling environment that supports the effective functioning of LCMA. The political and structural aspects of ammunition management determine the efficiency of LCMA-related
processes and activities: rather than being opposing concepts,
the political dynamics and technical aspects of ammunition
management are tightly intertwined.

What Is LCMA?

operational needs. It is also seen as the only long-term strat-

Ensuring effective management of ammunition requires a

egy for preventing the excessive accumulation of surplus and

comprehensive approach that allows states to meet their long-

for mitigating the safety and security risks inherent to all am-

term strategic and operational requirements and ensure safe

munition stockpiles.3 Such an approach takes into account the

and secure ammunition stockpiles. LCMA is an example of

technical aspects of ammunition management that are often

such an approach and recognizes the importance of adequate

covered by stockpile management efforts, as well as the relat-

technical capabilities but also emphasizes the political dimen-

ed structural and political dynamics. This results in planning

sion of managing ammunition across its life cycle: planning,

challenges and has significant budgetary implications for gov-

procurement, stockpile management, and disposal. This sec-

ernments. A systems-based approach to the life-cycle man-

tion provides an overview of the safety and security implica-

agement of ammunition (LCMA), and a long-term strategy to

tions of improper stockpile management before introducing

execute it, can help a state to address these challenges by min-

the concept of LCMA.

imizing the probability of excessive surplus accumulation and
mitigating diversion and UEMS risks while meeting national
strategic and operational needs.

UEMS, Diversion, and Surplus Accumulation
Despite growing awareness, in many states ineffective man-

This article provides an overview of the LCMA approach.

agement of ammunition stockpiles continues to be the norm.

Drawing on previous Small Arms Survey work such as

All ammunition stockpiles pose a risk of UEMS and diversion
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Figure 1. Number of UEMS incidents per year, 1979–2018. (Data available until end of February 2018.)
Figure courtesy of Small Arms Survey (n.d.).

along all points of the national stockpile chain: manufacture,

ammunition-related risks are not usually designed or imple-

storage, employment, and disposal. According to the Small

mented in a way that would address the systematic failures

Arms Survey’s UEMS Database, about 580 UEMS occurred

in stockpile management that lead to UEMS, diversion, and

in more than 100 countries between 1979 and February 2018,

excessive surplus accumulation. A key challenge faced by na-

often with grave social, economic, and political consequenc-

tional authorities, donors, and implementing organizations is

es (see Figure 1).7 In addition to fueling crime and terrorism,

to deliver appropriate technical programs to respond to inci-

ammunition that is diverted from state stockpiles can affect

dents of UEMS and diversion, as well as to address the under-

the duration and intensity of armed conflicts.8

lying, higher-level causes of these events. The effectiveness of

States view conventional ammunition stockpiles as assets

technical initiatives cannot be guaranteed without addressing

rather than liabilities and thus have a tendency to retain am-

systemic shortcomings. International guidelines emphasize

munition stockpiles in excess of strategic and operation-

that states take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance in en-

al requirements. In some contexts, together with ineffective

suring the safety and security of stockpiles to the highest pos-

stockpile management practices, this leads to the accumula-

sible standards.12 Effectively addressing both is contingent on

tion of unsafe, unserviceable, and obsolete surpluses in the

adopting a comprehensive approach to ammunition manage-

national stockpile. The result is a build-up of ammunition and

ment, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey’s LCMA model.

an increase in safety and security risks.9 Surplus accumulation also leads to a considerable financial burden for states in
terms of operational, maintenance, and destruction costs.

10

6

LCMA: A Comprehensive Means of
Ammunition Management

Historically, national authorities, international donors, and

LCMA comprises a comprehensive set of integrated pro-

practitioners have adopted technical approaches for dealing

cesses and activities that ensure sustainable and cost-

with surplus accumulation and mitigating the risk of UEMS

effective management of ammunition, delivering a safe and

and diversion. Often under the heading of physical securi-

secure stockpile that meets national strategic and operation-

ty and stockpile management (PSSM), the aim is to improve

al needs. The LCMA approach recognizes the importance of

stockpile management practices by bringing them in line with

adequate technical capabilities but also emphasizes the polit-

international best practices, such as the measures elaborated in

ical dimension of managing ammunition across its life cycle.

11

the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).

It requires that state actors at the strategic, operational, and

Technical approaches have a number of benefits: they can be

tactical levels work together on multiple ammunition-related

cost-effective and help to mitigate the risk of UEMS, diversion,

aspects to ensure cost-effective management of the entire na-

and surplus accumulation at storage locations.

tional stockpile.

One of the main shortcomings of the technical approach is

The LMCA model draws on current practices among a

its lack of sustainability. Despite the increase in safety and

number of states that participate in NATO’s Partnership for

security, most technical programs and initiatives to reduce

Peace (PfP) program as well as other NATO partners that
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Representations of LCMA models
tend to be linear depictions that mask
the degree of interaction and sequencing among the functional elements of
the system. Such depictions also tend to
omit the key role of national ownership,
which complements and supports the
functional elements and is critical to the
overall integrity of an LCMA system.
In contrast, Figure 2 highlights the interrelationships among the elements. It
also stresses the importance of the two
crucial aspects of ammunition management: the political, which is the structural element necessary for effectiveness
of the functional elements; and the technical, which is the functional elements
necessary for the management of am-

Figure 2. The Small Arms Survey’s LCMA Model.

munition across its life cycle.

Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.
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implement comprehensive ammunition management systems.13 These states have well-established militaries and a
long history of ammunition management. While national
approaches may differ, one feature is central to all: the effectiveness of LCMA systems in these states is ensured by a
high degree of national ownership. This feature guarantees
an enabling environment, a prerequisite for sustainable ammunition management.

Milestones
Throughout an LCMA system, decisions are made in order to
manage the national stockpile and mitigate the risk of UEMS
and diversion. Milestones are points in the life cycle where the
most critical decisions are made regarding transition across
the functional elements of LCMA and their related processes
and activities.14 There are a number of milestones within any
LCMA system. Examples include:

»» Planning to procurement: involves the development
LCMA Model
By analyzing the various LCMA systems observed in the
NATO and PfP states, the Small Arms Survey developed a general LCMA model (Figure 2). It is composed of one structural
element and four functional elements. To be effective, all elements must work together as an integrated and efficient whole.
The structural element, which involves national ownership
and its associated enabling conditions, supports the effective
and efficient management of ammunition across the life cycle
to ensure the integrity and sustainability of the LCMA system. Often recognized as a key aspect of LCMA, the structural aspects of ammunition management are rarely elaborated
in detail by international guidelines. The LCMA model also

and approval of strategic plans and budgets for the acquisition and management of types and quantities of
ammunition necessary for achieving defense goals and
operational requirements.

»» Procurement to stockpile management: involves the
procurement of ammunition based on confirmation
that the items being acquired are safe and suitable for
service (also known as an S3 process).

»» Stockpile management to disposal: involves the approval of disposal of ammunition following a national
disposal review.

»» Disposal to planning: involves the certification or confirmation of disposal activities.

consists of four functional elements: planning, procurement,
stockpile management, and disposal, which ensure the safety,

Prerequisites for Implementing LCMA Systems

security, and cost-effectiveness of ammunition stockpiles. The

An enabling environment is a prerequisite for sustainable

four functional elements draw and, where necessary, elabo-

ammunition management. It allows for long-term policies and

rate on the best practices for stockpile management accord-

plans to become targeted, integrated, and coordinated pro-

ing to the IATG.

grams aimed at effectively managing the national stockpile
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and mitigating the risks posed by the ammunition. There is

The concept of enabling conditions is inherent in U.N.

agreement, both within and outside the U.N. system, that a

General Assembly Resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from

high degree of national ownership is necessary for sustainable

the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles

ammunition management. Despite the recognition that na-

in surplus” (2017), which recognizes “the importance of ap-

tional ownership matters, there is little guidance on what it

propriate national ammunition management structures and

means in practice. This section provides an overview of the

procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doc-

concept of national ownership before discussing the enabling

trine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management

conditions that foster it and support effective implementation

and finances, and infrastructure in order to ensure sustain-

of LCMA.

ability in ammunition management.”20 The rest of this section

16

presents the four enabling conditions in more detail.

National Ownership for
Ammunition Management

Normative Framework

At its core, national ownership is grounded in the premise

An LCMA system needs to be anchored in and informed by a

that states need to take responsibility for ammunition man-

normative framework that provides guidance on ammunition

agement and be actively engaged in ensuring the safety and

management at different operational levels. The development

security of their stockpiles. A state demonstrates national

of an appropriate framework is a national responsibility and

ownership when national actors—including relevant politi-

is based on national needs and priorities. For states without a

cal decision-makers, armed forces planning and logistics staff,

normative framework in place, the IATG offer concrete guid-

and procurement authorities—have defined and active roles

ance and tools for ammunition safety and security, as well as

in designing, implementing, and monitoring all processes and

a model for effective stockpile management. They also provide

activities across the ammunition life cycle, such as planning,

advice on developing technical directives for ammunition

procurement, stockpile management, and disposal.

management and on the roles and competencies of ammuni-

The IATG state that “the primary responsibility for conven-

tion specialists.21

tional ammunition stockpile management shall rest with the
Government of the state holding the ammunition.”17 It follows

Organizational Framework

that national ownership is not simply about political buy-in

National ownership for ammunition management calls for

for ammunition management but also about taking respon-

context-specific organizational frameworks (i.e., relevant insti-

sibility for setting up and maintaining an LCMA system by:

tutional and organizational structures that are led and staffed

»» Establishing a set of effective life-cycle and enabling

by national personnel) and allows for coordination and over-

processes that allow them to make milestone-relevant

sight of ammunition management processes and activities, and

decisions and to plan and implement programs for each

ensures efficient implementation. Establishing a framework in-

functional element of LCMA.

volves meeting a number of preconditions, including:

18,19

»» Providing national financial resources for the system

»» A high level of institutional and organizational devel-

to cover the cost of procurement and post-acquisition

opment. An LCMA system demands a high level of in-

costs, such as those associated with storage, surveillance,

stitutional and organizational development, with clearly

transportation, maintenance, security, and disposal.

defined tasks, competencies, and responsibilities.

»» Facilitating the establishment of the enabling condi-

»» A high level of flexibility. The organizational structure

tions necessary for supporting the effective manage-

must also be flexible enough to ensure that there is in-

ment of ammunition over its life cycle.

formation exchange, coordination, and oversight among
relevant stakeholders, both international and national.

Enabling Conditions for LCMA
There is a dynamic relationship between national ownership

8

Infrastructure and Equipment

and the enabling conditions that make LCMA possible. In

Infrastructure and equipment are essential to support the

turn, these conditions foster national ownership for ammuni-

implementation of LCMA. A state cannot claim to have the

tion management and ensure the sustainability of the LCMA

capacity to ensure the safety and security of its stockpiles or

system as a whole. They include a normative framework, an

the disposal of surplus without them. For this reason, the last

organizational framework, infrastructure and equipment,

decade has seen a considerable increase in the number and

and human resources.

scale of international assistance programs related to capacity
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development.22 Since 2012, the international community has

is maintained over the entire system. An information man-

coordinated its efforts to provide infrastructure upgrades to

agement system also allows planners to gather essential in-

strategic ammunition (and weapon) storage. Similar efforts

formation for the development of element-specific programs,

have also been seen in Mali, where the international com-

which turn identified needs into achievable outputs given fi-

munity has focused on improving physical security infra-

nancial and human resource constraints.24

structure in order to prevent weapons and ammunition from
getting into the hands of insurgent groups.23

Procurement

Human Resources

is suitable for the implementation of the national defense pol-

An effective procurement process delivers ammunition that
The implementation and sustainability of an LCMA system

icy in a safe and secure manner.25 While the planning element

depends on the availability of adequately trained personnel

of the LCMA model determines the general parameters for the

at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and the ex-

quantity and type of ammunition to be procured, the procure-

istence of effective personnel management systems. Training

ment element begins with the approval of ammunition for ac-

on basic stockpile management activities—such as cleaning,

quisition and concludes with its entry into service.

storehouse maintenance and organization, inspection and

Even before an order is placed, a limited amount of ammu-

surveillance of ammunition, inventory management, and ac-

nition is usually acquired for testing (i.e., demonstration and

counting—can help to reduce the probability of UEMS and

evaluation) purposes to determine the safety and suitability for

diversion. In addition, training is key in fostering national

service of the ammunition.26 Once ammunition is deemed suit-

ownership and is most effective when it is transferred and in-

able for service, it can be acquired either from producers lo-

tegrated into a recipient state’s institutions.

cated within their national territory or, more commonly, from
commercial suppliers in other states. States import new and

Functional Elements of an LCMA System

surplus ammunition via commercial sales, government-to-

There are four functional elements of the LCMA model that

government sales, or gifts. The import of surplus ammunition

relate to the different stages of the ammunition life cycle:

is cost-effective if it is in good condition.27 However, purchas-

planning, procurement, stockpile management, and disposal.

ing from old stockpiles can lead to “controversial quality con-

The elements must be managed in order to ensure that they

trol, dubious traceability issues, and procurement fraud.”28

operate in a coordinated manner and that the risk of UEMS

Procurement systems are expected to adhere to good gov-

and diversion is kept to a minimum. Each functional element

ernance principles and include robust anti-corruption pro-

is summarized below.

visions. Regardless of the mode of acquisition, states manage
the safety and security of ammunition during the acquisition

Planning

process, with a focus on ensuring state control and oversight,

Planning is essential to the overall management of ammuni-

comprehensive registration and record-keeping, and safe

tion. An LCMA system must be thoroughly planned from the

and secure transportation.29 States also develop laws, regula-

outset, with dedicated resources and procedures put in place

tions, and administrative procedures to control and regulate

in advance of any new acquisitions or other alterations to the

the import, export, transit or transshipment, and brokering

system. Direction is provided by a state’s national defense

of military items and technologies, including ammunition.

policy, which is translated into a comprehensive, long-term

Recording each stage of the acquisition process and of the am-

defense strategy that defines the scope of LCMA planning

munition’s entry into service is essential to ensuring the safety

(Figure 3). Consequently, a primary milestone of the planning

and security of the ammunition.30 This is particularly true at

element is the development of a cohesive national ammuni-

moments when the ammunition is susceptible to theft, loss, or

tion stockpile plan that meets the long-term defense planning

an unplanned explosion.

goals.
The LCMA planning begins by defining the nation’s am-

Stockpile Management

munition requirements and continues through the develop-

In order to meet operational and strategic requirements, as

ment of integrated programs. It is incumbent on planners

well as to ensure the safety and security of stored items, it is

to understand all of the downstream ramifications of their

important to emplace effective stockpile management poli-

stockpile-related decisions. For this to take place, an informa-

cies and practices. Stockpile management begins when am-

tion management system must be in place to ensure oversight

munition enters the stockpile and ends when it leaves, be it

ISSUE 22.2 @ AUGUST 2018
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National Defense Policy
Long-term defense strategy
Developed by the MoD,
approved by the head of
state/national legislature

LCMA planning
Developed by chief of
defense/joint chiefs of staff
approved by the MoD

Developed by general
or joint staff, approved by
joint chiefs of staff

Figure 3. Long-term defense planning and LCMA.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6

through issuance (for training or operations), consumption

process ends with the physical removal of disposal-designated

(ammunition spent), or disposal (through exports or demil-

ammunition from the stockpile as a result of a disposal action.

itarization). With many complex and interrelated processes

A number of milestones are related to disposal and include

and activities, stockpile management requires continuous
review and assessment to ensure the adequacy of resources, infrastructure, equipment, and personnel. These review
processes form the key milestones of the stockpile management element.
The stockpile management element of the Survey’s LCMA

»» The decision to dispose of ammunition.
»» The selection of a disposal method and process in the
case of demilitarization.

»» The completion of disposal activities.
»» The confirmation that ammunition has been disposed
of properly and in accordance with a disposal decision.

model is based on the IATG—more specifically, the IATG

While historically various disposal methods were avail-

core groups of activities around which all stockpile manage-

able to a state, there currently are only two internationally-

ment processes and activities are structured.31 To ensure effec-

accepted disposal methods: exports (sales or donations) and

tive stockpile management and reduce the risk of unplanned

demilitarization. Of these two, states tend to prefer export;

explosions and diversion, the core groups interact very close-

however, international arms and ammunition control efforts

ly, with individual activities depending on or influencing

emphasize demilitarization.36 The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

each other across group boundaries. The six core groups of

establishes legally binding commitments governing the ex-

ammunition-based activities are accounting, destruction,

port, import, transit, transshipment, and brokering of con-

maintenance, stockpile security, storage, and transport.

ventional arms and ammunition. A number of technologies

Management of the risks inherent to ammunition stor-

are potentially available for demilitarization, each one with

age is a fundamental component of stockpile management.

advantages and disadvantages. Although commonly used,

Adherence to the IATG fulfills many of the requirements of

open burning (OB) and open detonation (OD) are modes of

an integrated risk management system. Figure 4 outlines the

disposal that are increasingly discouraged by states due to

overarching risk management approach of the IATG, in par-

health and environmental concerns.37a

32

ticular the relationship between the different components of

Age, unclear history, or the existence of internal damage,

risk management. The IATG also offer detailed explanations

corrosion, and other dangerous conditions (such as exuda-

of each component of risk management and techniques for

tion or crystallization) can mean demilitarization causes

stockpile management.

significantly greater risks than those associated with new

33

34

ammunition. Advanced planning is key to fully address-

Disposal
Disposal is the removal of unsafe, unserviceable, obsolete,

reduce costs and ensure appropriate equipment and train-

or excess ammunition from the national stockpile. Until it

ing for individuals assigned to accomplish safe and effi-

has been physically removed from the stockpile, disposal-

cient disposal and decommissioning tasks. Managing risk

designated ammunition is treated as part of the national

for demilitarization also requires developing effective mu-

A state’s decision to dispose of ammunition as

nitions emergency response processes and procedures for

part of a national disposal review is the first step in the pro-

the decommissioning of contaminated sites, both of which

cess, and a number of factors can influence that decision. The

require the participation of specially trained individuals.

stockpile.

10

ing ammunition disposal methodologies and risks, and can

35
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Figure 4. IATG risk management matrix.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6,11, 37b

LCMA in Context: Lessons Learned from Bosnia
and Herzegovina

undermined the disposal process (Figure 5). Consequently,
international pressure for addressing the safety and securi-

Recognizing that a comprehensive approach is best suited to

ty concerns of the national ammunition stockpile increased

address complex ammunition management challenges, this

by the end of the 2000s, paving the way for the develop-

section uses the LCMA model presented as a framework for

ment of a plan to establish an LCMA system in the country.

analyzing the emergence of an LCMA system in BiH during

The priority for BiH to date has been to identify and dis-

the period 2012–2016. The section stresses the importance of

pose of excessive, unstable, and unsafe ammunition and to

focusing on ammunition management as a distinct area of

put in place the planning and management processes that

concern when considering ammunition, weapons, and explo-

will ensure the safety and security of the ammunition that

sives (AWE) challenges in post-conflict settings. It highlights

the country needs to implement its national defense and

ten lessons learned from implementing four of the five main

security strategy.

elements of an effective LCMA system: national ownership,

Lesson 1: National ownership is fundamental for ef-

planning, stockpile management, and disposal. The fifth ele-

fective LCMA. The international community substituted for

ment has not been implemented, as BiH has not yet made pro-

a lack of national capacity to manage and dispose of surplus

visions for the procurement of ammunition.

ammunition in post-conflict BiH. Since 2012, however, the in-

The disintegration of Yugoslavia had serious repercus-

ternational community has focused on building national ca-

sions for ammunition management in BiH. The onset of con-

pacity to ensure ownership of the LCMA system. As a result

flict, in June 1991, combined with a U.N. arms embargo on

of these efforts, high-ranking BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD)

Yugoslavia’s successor states in January 1992, had serious neg-

and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) per-

ative consequences for ammunition management capacities

sonnel, including the minister of defense and chief of defense,

and practices. The immediate post-conflict period was char-

are now taking the lead in related decision-making and plan-

acterized by efforts to exercise basic control of ammunition

ning on ammunition as well as ensuring that armed forces

and weapon stockpiles in BiH instead of developing life-cycle

personnel are sufficiently trained.

38

management systems for ammunition and weapons.39

Lesson 2: The coordinated, long-term commitment of

By 2000, the focus had switched toward defense reform, mil-

international partners is essential for the establishment of

itary downsizing, and the identification and disposal of sur-

LCMA in a post-conflict setting. Prior to 2013, there was a

plus weapons and ammunition. Despite the urgency to deal

lack of coordination, communication, and information shar-

with the surplus ammunition, and the establishment of a

ing between international and regional organizations, states,

normative framework to do so, competing political interests

and NGOs working to address BiH’s ammunition stockpile

ISSUE 22.2 @ AUGUST 2018
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challenges.40 To address these issues, all key internation-

single national ammunition list, and establish a national in-

al stakeholders committed to providing expertise and re-

ventory management system.45 BiH’s limited capacity made it

sources in a complementary and coordinated way to help the

difficult to conduct the 100 percent inventory in an effective

BiH MoD and the AFBiH address the challenges posed by

and timely manner.46 Therefore, from 2012 to 2013, AFBiH

the AWE stockpile. By the end of 2012, thanks to the non-

personnel received training in basic ammunition handling,

paper, the international community had streamlined

testing, storage, LCMA regulations and standard operating

its efforts on how to address BiH’s ammunition stock-

procedures (SOP), and inventory management.42 The AFBiH

pile challenges.40

began the ‘100 percent inventory’ in 2013 MoD, and it is ex-

41

Lesson 3: Implementing effective LCMA in a postconflict setting requires early agreement on overall objec-

Lesson 6: Stockpile safety depends on an assessment of

tives, specific priorities, and resource requirements. During

the condition of stored ammunition. A key component of ef-

the first quarter of 2013, the international community con-

fective LCMA, more specifically of the 100 percent inventory

vened a task force consisting of key international and BiH

referred to previously, is the ability to determine the physi-

stakeholders to develop an AWE Master Plan that defined the

cal condition, chemical stability, and hazard classification

desired outcome for addressing AWE challenges as “the trans-

of ammunition in the national stockpile.47 With the support

parent disposal of surplus ammunition and weapons and the

of the international community and as part of the 100 per-

introduction of a sustainable ammunition and weapons life-

cent inventory mentioned in Lesson 5, the BiH MoD decided

cycle management system in BiH.” The AWE Master Plan

to undertake

42

AWE challenges. It also defined the roles and responsibilities

»» A stock-check of the entire ammunition stockpile.
»» A visual technical inspection of all the ammunition.
»» A chemical test of the propellant, using quick propellant

of the different international actors, the BiH MoD, and the

analysis kits (QPAK) provided by the Austrian compo-

AFBiH.43 The AWE Master Plan was endorsed by all relevant

nent of the mobile training team (MTT) Project.48

provided clarity on the international community’s capacities,
resources, and potential contributions in addressing BiH’s

national and international stakeholders.

Lesson 4: Sustainable LCMA requires robust organizational structures and appropriate personnel.

These additional assessments laid the foundations for the development of an ammunition surveillance system in BiH.

Lesson 7: Adequate resources and capacities are needed

The AWE Master Plan defined the organizational structure

for a safe and secure ammunition stockpile. Effective stock-

required to support the programs and activities for the trans-

pile management involves the safe and secure storage, trans-

parent disposal of surplus ammunition and the implemen-

portation, and handling of ammunition.49 In accordance with

tation of sustainable LCMA.44 This organizational structure

BiH’s Law on Defence and the future operational require-

ensured effective and efficient coordination of national and

ments of the AFBiH, OSCE SECUP, and UNDP EXPLODE,

international activities, confidence among all key stakehold-

assistance projects upgraded safety and security standards for

ers, and empowered BiH authorities and senior leaders within

two prospective ammunition storage sites in BiH: Kula 1 and

international organizations.

2, and Krupa. The Doboj demilitarization facility was also

Moreover, appropriately experienced, skilled, and motivated

upgraded, because these sites have capacity to house BiH re-

personnel should be placed in key positions to ensure that the

quired ammunition and can be maintained by the AFBiH.50

organizational structure delivers the desired changes. A criti-

These infrastructure upgrades, as well as donations of equip-

cal factor in the case of BiH was the European Union Force

ment and training provided by the EUFOR MTT Project

(EUFOR) commander’s decision to create the position of se-

troop-contributing nations, reflect good coordination be-

nior advisor for weapons and ammunition disposal (SAWAD)

tween BiH and its international partners.51

in April 2013. SAWAD can influence decision-making, over-

Lesson 8: Effective and efficient surplus disposal re-

sees implementation, and ensures the overall coordination of

quires adequate normative and institutional frameworks,

Master Plan activities.

as well as the necessary political will. As noted previously,

Lesson 5: Successful LCMA rests on a comprehensive inventory of the ammunition stockpile.

12

pected to be finished by the end of 2018.

ammunition disposal was a politically sensitive issue during
the late 2000s. While presidential approval was (and contin-

It was not until 2012 that a decision was made for BiH to

ues to be) required for any form of disposal, the process for

conduct a comprehensive inventory—locally referred to as the

authorization is now more efficient, and approval is grant-

100 per cent inventory—of its ammunition stockpile, create a

ed more quickly than in the past.40 The reduction in the time
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Figure 5. Disposal of ammunition in BiH using open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) and other forms of demilitarization, 2006–
2016.
Figure courtesy of Carapic and Holtom, 2018.

taken for the presidential approval led to a significant increase

demonstrate support for international partners. The BiH

in the ammunition disposal rate during the period 2015–2016

president must approve the disposal of surplus through in-

(see Figure 5).

ternational donation after an assessment of political, strate-

52

Despite BiH authorities preferring to export their surplus

gic, and foreign policy considerations. MoD BiH and AFBiH

ammunition, demilitarization continues to be the primary

representatives have raised two sets of concerns regarding

mode of disposal in the country.52 International stakeholders

such donations. The first is a concern over foregone profit.

have facilitated the demilitarization and destruction process

International stakeholders, however, have stressed that dona-

by increasing the capacity and skills of AFBiH personnel and

tions help to dispose of ammunition that, while still service-

employing independent contractors at the TROM Doboj de-

able, needs to be used quickly.52 Such ammunition is unlikely

militarization facility and the Glamoc range.

to meet the quality needs of commercial importers. The sec-

51

Lesson 9: Serviceable but surplus ammunition may be

ond concern relates to the perceived risk of donated material

disposed of through export sales authorized in conformity

diverting.57 This reflects recent media coverage of the pos-

with a country’s international commitments. Prior to 2013,

sible diversion of BiH donations intended for Iraqi govern-

international partners and key BiH stakeholders had diver-

ment forces to non-state armed groups in the Middle East and

gent views regarding the export of surplus ammunition.

40

North Africa.58 Yet diversion risks can be reduced via interna-

Stakeholders have come to accept export sales as a valid meth-

tional cooperation and good practice.55 At the same time, such

od for the disposal of surplus if carried out by national au-

donations can allow BiH to contribute to efforts to strengthen

thorities in accordance with international standards, such

international peace and security.59

as those of the ATT.54 Several independent assessments have
concluded that BiH’s arms export control legislation and ad-

Looking Forward

ministrative procedures meet such standards. The BiH MoD

A comprehensive ammunition management approach is re-

has developed administrative guidance for the disposal of

quired to ensure that a state’s national stockpile is safe, se-

surplus by export in the 2012 Plan for Resolving Surplus.56

cure, and operational when needed in order to meet national

55

Lesson 10: Serviceable but surplus ammunition can

and strategic objectives. The LCMA approach not only allows

also be disposed of through international donation to

for the mitigation of the risk of UEMS and diversion, but also
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ensures sustainability of international cooperation and assistance projects. The most recent General Assembly Resolution
on the “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/RES/70/35)
stresses the need to develop and implement cooperation and
assistance programs that ensure sustainability—i.e., are able
to mitigate the immediate risk of UEMS and diversion and
have a lasting impact on ammunition management practices
at the national level. To date, a limited number of international cooperation and assistance projects have been designed and
implemented with the intention of ensuring sustainability by
addressing ammunition management practices across the life
cycle: from planning to procurement, stockpile management,
and disposal. The case of BiH is an illustrative example.
From a practical perspective, this article provides an overview of the experience and lessons learned from efforts to establish and implement a sustainable LCMA system in BiH.
The BiH experience is useful for other prolonged post-conflict
environments or those states aiming to establish an LCMA
system. Establishing and implementing better stockpile management processes and ultimately LCMA are long-term and
challenging endeavors. These efforts do not need to be accomplished all at one time. Improvements can be incrementally
structured and implemented based on national priorities,
available resources, capacities, and capabilities, considering
the potential efficiencies and benefits that will be derived
along the way with regards to the national stockpile’s functionality, safety, security, and ability to meet national strategic
and operational needs.
See endnotes page 59
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